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feat: dApp Store readiness, keyed rate limits, security-audit fixes and Next.js 16.4.3 - #18

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Oct 25, 2026
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operatoruplift merged 27 commits into
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@operatoruplift operatoruplift commented Oct 8, 2026 •

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What this PR ships

Everything Buffer needs for its Solana dApp Store listing, plus the fixes from the 16 October 2026 security audit, in one branch.

Store readiness (the original scope): privacy and terms pages that meet Developer Agreement §10.6, in-app account deletion through delete_own_account (applied in production on 2026-10-08), an English-only Android shell, and the listing kit under docs/dapp-store/.

Android shell hardening (android/): every external launch is guarded, so a phone without a wallet or mail app shows a short message instead of closing the app; intent: URLs lose component, selector, extras and URI grants and must be BROWSABLE; downloads work (DownloadManager for https, a two-method page bridge for blob: and data:); mixed content is never allowed, third-party cookies and file access are off, popups need a user gesture, and the backup rules exclude everything.

Rate limiter (folds in #19): HMAC-keyed hashes in the database, counters pruned every 3 minutes, privacy wording to match.

Security audit fixes

  • D-1 Migration files renamed to the versions the production ledger records; the three dashboard-applied scheduler migrations are checked in; the verification scripts skip them under PGlite.
  • B-1 The minute worker claims checks fairly across owners (least-recently served first, one per owner per minute); manual checks hold their own lease and are capped at 60 per owner per hour.
  • B-2 Ten failed worker-secret attempts in a minute pause the worker for the rest of that minute, with a warning in the log.
  • B-3 Live reads: the per-client limit is primary (30 a minute), the instance ceiling is 240 a minute and 8 in flight, and identical reads share a 5-second cache.
  • B-4 Saved reports are capped at 50 rows and 8 MiB per account, enforced in the database.
  • B-7 Legal pages dated 24 October 2026; the devnet-RPC and contact wording matches the deployment.
  • B-8 sharp and rolldown are declared devDependencies for the store-kit script.
  • B-9 The rate-limit secret is only ever posted to the project's https *.supabase.co origin; destination fingerprints are HMACs under the worker secret.
  • B-10 Retry-After is parsed as seconds or an HTTP date and capped at one hour.

Dependencies: Next.js 16.4.3 (folds in #17); follow-redirects and vite patched by npm audit fix. Remaining: the React Native chain pulled in by Mobile Wallet Adapter (never bundled) and the web3.js 1.x chain under the Velocity SDK, which needs a major upgrade.

Database changes, in order, after this deploys

  1. supabase/migrations/20261008120000_rate_limit_retention_and_keyed_hash.sql
  2. supabase/migrations/20261017103000_worker_fairness.sql
  3. supabase/migrations/20261019090000_worker_secret_lockout.sql
  4. supabase/migrations/20261019091500_saved_report_quota.sql

Each has a PGlite verifier under scripts/. Afterwards supabase migration list should show no local-only or remote-only rows.

Environment

No new variables. BUFFER_ALERT_WORKER_SECRET must be 32 or more random characters; it now also keys destination fingerprints, so rotating it re-verifies destinations.

Verification

npm run typecheck, npm run lint, npm test (673 tests) and the six PGlite verifiers (alert schema, hosted monitoring, scheduler, account deletion, rate limit, saved-report quota) pass; npm run build passes on Next.js 16.4.3; the Android shell compiles as an unsigned release build; CI runs the e2e specs.

Supersedes

#17 (Next.js upgrade) and #19 (keyed rate limits), both folded in.

Addendum, 25 October 2026

  • Legibility: the smallest text on the app screens moves to 11 and 12 px (Lighthouse legible share 22% to 82% at 390 px), and the muted label colour now meets 4.5:1 on the scenario panel.
  • vitest 5.0.5 (the @vitest/mocker advisory), which retires Dependabot's grouped PR.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw

operatoruplift and others added 6 commits October 3, 2026 02:04
The advisory (critical, published 2026-09-30) is remote code execution in
the Node.js `ImageResponse` from `next/og` when attacker-controlled values
reach SVG content, attributes or styles. This app does not import `next/og`
or `ImageResponse`, so it was not exploitable, but `npm audit --omit=dev`
reported it as critical. 16.3.8 is the newest 16.3 patch release;
eslint-config-next moves with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
The Solana dApp Store Publisher Policy requires in-app account deletion.
Vercel holds no service-role key, so a new security definer function,
public.delete_own_account(), deletes auth.users where id = auth.uid() and
every owner-keyed row cascades with it. It takes no argument, pins an
empty search_path and is executable by authenticated only.

My reports gains a Delete account section with an in-page confirmation.
The client calls the RPC with the confirmed session only, then clears the
account's device alert settings and signs out. Failures say whether
anything was deleted, and a retry is safe.

Tests: PGlite checks the cascade across all six owner-keyed tables, owner
isolation and that anon, service_role and a forged anon subject cannot
call it; unit tests cover the client flow; Playwright covers the dialog
with mocked Auth and PostgREST.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…ion accurately

Adds public /privacy and /terms pages for Operator Uplift, built from what
the code does: Supabase accounts, saved reports, alert rules,
destinations, events and deliveries, hashed-IP rate limiting, the
read-only wallet connection, processors, retention, account deletion,
security and the 18+ requirement. The terms carry the Solana dApp Store
Developer Agreement 10.6 clause, the not-advice and estimate limits, the
alert caveat, no warranty and limitation of liability.

Both pages are linked from the landing footer, the workspace navigation
and footer, the sign-in page and the sitemap. Contact uses
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPPORT_EMAIL when set and the GitHub issue tracker otherwise.

The landing hero, FAQ and privacy section, docs/PROVIDER.md and
docs/DESCRIPTION.md now describe the optional read-only wallet connection
and the Android app instead of claiming there is no wallet connection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
… build

androidResources.localeFilters keeps English resources only, and a
values-en string set declares English explicitly. aapt2 dump badging now
reports `locales: '--_--' 'en'` (2 entries) instead of 86, so the store
no longer reads 85 translated locales the app does not support.

docs/seeker-and-pwa.md now gives the Gradle signing route that the build
actually reads, warns that a missing signing value silently produces an
unsigned APK, replaces the /rwa deep-link example with a real /app link
and updates the Publisher Portal facts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…al pages

The longer read-only note wraps on phones; it now flows inline so the
check mark stays on its first line. Both legal pages use a shared
"Buffer · Legal" eyebrow instead of repeating the title, and the deletion
check only requires the migration to sort after the alert migrations, so
later migrations do not break it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
docs/dapp-store/listing.md holds the Portal text (name, subtitle and
description with character counts, What's new, URLs, reviewer notes that
name the real Delete account controls) and a submit checklist. The
1200x600 banner is composed in scripts/dapp-store/banner.html from the
brand masters and rendered at deviceScaleFactor 1; its scenario card is
the app's own Long + short preset. Six 1080x1920 screenshots were captured
from a local production build of this branch reading live mainnet data,
so the landing shot shows the corrected hero line.

scripts/generate-dapp-store-assets.mjs regenerates the banner and
screenshots (--base-url for any build) and verifies real PNG sizes, file
sizes, text limits and that every listed screenshot exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
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Project Deployment Actions Updated
buffer Ready Ready Preview Oct 25, 2026 1:36pm UTC

Request Review

These projects are not entered in Solana Mobile × RadiantsDAO CLOCK IN, so the
store guide no longer frames the listing as a prize requirement or keeps the
hackathon checklist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
operatoruplift and others added 2 commits October 8, 2026 21:04
Read-only checks on production found two privacy defects in the hosted
limiter. Nothing called private.prune_rate_limits(), so counters from
17 September were still stored. Each key was the server's unkeyed
SHA-256 of the client IP, which brute force reverses for IPv4.

20261008120000_rate_limit_retention_and_keyed_hash.sql keeps the
consume_rate_limit signature, result and secret, but stores
HMAC-SHA-256 of the sent key under a random 32-byte key in
private.rate_limit_hash_key (RLS on, no grants to anon, authenticated
or service_role). The limiter is SECURITY DEFINER with an empty
search_path. Every check deletes expired counters, and where pg_cron
is installed (it is on the hosted project) buffer-prune-rate-limits
runs every three minutes. Windows over one minute are refused, so no
counter outlives the last request by more than four minutes. The
migration deletes every counter stored under the old hash, records the
limiter's tables for fresh projects, revokes EXECUTE from browser
roles and service_role, and grants it back to anon only. It also
requires a configured secret: the hosted check passed any secret when
the config row was missing.

The server keeps sending a digest, never an IP, so the migration is
safe before or after the app deploys. rate-limit.ts gets its first
unit tests, pinning that contract and the per-process fallback.
scripts/verify-rate-limit.mjs (82 assertions, in CI) checks the
migration against the hosted pre-migration definitions and an empty
project, applied as a non-superuser owner. The account-deletion
verifier now loads pgcrypto, as Supabase does, because it applies
every migration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…olicy

The rate-limiting section said counters keep a one-way SHA-256 hash of
the IP and gave no retention period. It now says they hold an
HMAC-SHA-256 under a random key that never leaves the database, and
that each counter is deleted when its one-minute window ends, at the
next check or by a cleanup every three minutes, so none is kept more
than five minutes after the last request. The retention list says the
same. No other legal text changes, and the browser spec checks the new
wording on desktop and mobile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
operatoruplift and others added 2 commits October 8, 2026 21:17
The policy promises a new date whenever it changes, and this PR changes how
rate-limit counters are hashed and kept. The terms page shares the date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…ckup

The dApp Store clause now names the Solana Mobile Parties, says they are not
a party to these terms and have no responsibility or liability to the user,
and extends the No warranty and Limitation of liability sections to them, as
section 10.6 of the Solana dApp Store Developer Agreement requires. The e2e
spec asserts the new sentences.

The Android shell no longer allows backup, so the WebView's session cookie and
local storage are not copied to Google or to a new phone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
operatoruplift and others added 14 commits October 17, 2026 10:13
…loads, stop mixed content

The Web Shell template handed every link to startActivity without a catch, so a phone with no
wallet or mail app closed the app the moment Use my wallet or a support link was tapped, and
intent: URLs were started with their component intact. Downloads were dropped entirely, so the
JSON and CSV exports did nothing on a Seeker.

- LinkOpener catches every launch and shows a short message instead of crashing. intent: URLs
  lose component, selector, extras and URI grants and must be BROWSABLE. Only https, mailto,
  solana-wallet and intent leave the shell; everything else is blocked.
- WebShellDownloads saves https downloads through DownloadManager and blob: and data: downloads
  through a two-method page bridge that only creates new files under Downloads.
- Mixed content is never allowed (localhost stays a secure context for Mobile Wallet Adapter),
  third-party cookies and file or content access are off, and popups need a user gesture.
- Backup and data-extraction rules exclude everything explicitly instead of the template stubs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
The hosted project recorded six of the checked-in migrations under the versions
at which they were applied, while the files carried local timestamps, so every
ledger comparison showed six local-only and six remote-only entries for the same
bodies. The files are renamed with git mv to the ledger versions (contents
untouched) and every reference in scripts/ and docs/ follows:

  20260915120000 -> 20260915180735 create_alert_pipeline
  20260919090000 -> 20260919172720 harden_alert_pipeline
  20260920010000 -> 20260919173121 harden_function_permissions
  20260920020000 -> 20260919183521 hosted_monitoring
  20260928120000 -> 20260928154216 liquidation_sentinels
  20261007120000 -> 20261008081817 delete_own_account

Three migrations existed only in production (the pg_net scheduler preparation,
the synchronous http 1.6 trigger and the delivered-acknowledgement helper). Their
bodies are checked in byte for byte under their ledger versions. They need
pg_cron, Vault and the http extension, which PGlite lacks, so
verify-account-deletion.mjs, the one script that applies every migration in
order, skips exactly those three by name and asserts they are present.
docs/DATABASE-VERIFICATION.md carries a dated note. Nothing was applied or
changed on the hosted project.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…hecks apart

claim_check ordered due rules "next_check nulls first", and every rule edit
resets next_check to null (guard_alert_rule). The scheduled worker drains one
rule a minute, so an owner who edited a rule each minute was always first and
another owner's due rule was never checked. A manual check from
POST /api/monitoring/rules/{id}/check also took the single global 45-second
lease, so repeated manual checks could keep the scheduled tick from claiming
anything, and nothing bounded manual checks beyond 30 a minute.

20261017103000_worker_fairness.sql replaces buffer_monitor_worker (same
signature, same anon-only grant, every other action unchanged):

- claim_check serves the owner whose rules were attempted least recently
  first, then the longest-due rule by coalesce(next_check, created_at), and
  claims at most one rule per owner per minute, whoever asked.
- Scheduled and manual checks hold separate leases (new nullable column
  alert_rules.check_lease_kind). The tick is blocked only by another scheduled
  lease; a manual check is blocked only by that owner's own manual lease; both
  still respect each rule's lease. A claim naming only the rule is scoped to
  the rule's owner, so the existing contract keeps working.
- start refuses more than 60 manual checks per owner per hour, in addition to
  the 30 per minute.

scripts/verify-hosted-monitoring.mjs proves it: owner A edits a rule every
minute for four cycles and the tick serves A, B, A, B; the tick claims B's rule
while A's manual check is in flight; manual leases are per owner; the hourly
cap throttles the 61st manual check. The CHECK_NOT_DUE message and
docs/ALERTS.md describe the new limits. Applying the one-claim-per-owner-per-
minute rule to manual checks as well is a product decision taken on the safe
side: it bounds provider reads per owner and the hourly cap is a second,
independent bound.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…rker after ten a minute

public.buffer_monitor_worker is callable with the publishable key by design;
the secret in p_secret is its only gate, and before this change a caller could
try values without limit and nothing was logged.

20261019090000_worker_secret_lockout.sql replaces the function (same
signature, same anon-only grant, the fairness changes kept). Failed attempts
are counted per calendar minute; after 10 in one minute every call, a correct
one included, is refused with 'Worker authentication paused' until the minute
ends, before any secret is compared. Every failure and every refusal raises a
WARNING in the PostgreSQL log carrying the count only, never the attempted
value.

The count lives in a sequence in the private schema, not a table: the failing
call must still end in the 42501 exception the server relies on, and that
exception rolls back any row the call wrote, while sequence state is
non-transactional. The value is minute*1000+failures; the sequence is revoked
from anon, authenticated and service_role like the private tables.

scripts/verify-hosted-monitoring.mjs proves the count survives each failure,
the pause refuses the right secret for the rest of the minute, refusals are
not counted, a new minute starts fresh, the warnings name the count and never
the secret, and browser roles cannot read or write the sequence.
docs/ALERTS.md states the 32-random-character minimum, how to generate and
rotate the secret, and that an attacker with the publishable key can pause
the worker for the rest of a minute by failing ten times, which was accepted
over unbounded guessing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…ing, cache identical reads

serveRead kept a per-instance window of 60 reads a minute and 4 in flight next
to the per-client limit of 30, so two clients reading steadily could exhaust an
instance for everyone, and every tap on Explore live risk was a new provider
read that counted against both budgets.

src/server/live-read-budget.ts now owns the budget, applied after validation:

- A five-second cache keyed by a SHA-256 digest of the normalised request
  (kind, protocol, network, authority, subaccount). Identical reads, concurrent
  ones included, share one provider call and consume no budget; failed reads
  are not cached. No address is retained.
- The per-client limit is the primary control: 30 reads a minute per client,
  counted in the shared store when it is configured and in a bounded local
  window per client digest when it is not.
- The per-instance ceiling is 240 reads a minute and 8 in flight, which no two
  clients can reach on their own.

ProviderFailure moves to src/server/provider-failure.ts so the budget module
and boundary.ts share it without a cycle; boundary.ts re-exports it for the
existing importers. tests/live-read-budget.test.ts covers the cache window and
sharing, uncached failures, both per-client paths, the instance ceiling, the
in-flight cap and serveRead end to end; the provider tests reset the shared
budget between cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…atabase

public.saved_reports accepted any number of rows of up to 256 KiB each. The
app lists the newest 50 and its sign-up form is gated, but the Auth API
accepts sign-ups regardless, so one account could fill the database.

20261019091500_saved_report_quota.sql adds a BEFORE INSERT trigger that counts
the account's rows and bytes under a per-account advisory lock (so concurrent
inserts cannot pass the count together) and refuses the 51st report or the
byte past 8 MiB with SQLSTATE 54000 and a fixed hint. Existing rows are
untouched; an account over a limit keeps its reports and can delete to make
room. The trigger function lives in the private schema with EXECUTE revoked
from browser roles; triggers fire regardless.

The app matches the code (isSavedReportQuotaError) and tells the person the
library is full, without marking the write uncertain, since nothing was
written. scripts/verify-saved-report-quota.mjs proves both caps as the real
authenticated role under RLS, that other accounts are unaffected, that
deletion makes room, that the per-report CHECK still applies, and that
browser roles cannot run the function; CI runs it with the other verifiers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…channels that exist

The privacy policy said Velocity devnet reads use Solana's public devnet RPC,
which is false when SOLANA_DEVNET_RPC_URL is set, and it promised "a private
way" to handle deletion and other requests while forbidding personal data in
public issues, a channel that exists only when NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPPORT_EMAIL is
configured.

- LEGAL_UPDATED is '24 October 2026' and LEGAL_UPDATED_ISO '2026-10-24'
  (shared by the privacy policy and the terms); the unit and e2e assertions
  follow.
- The devnet sentence names SOLANA_DEVNET_RPC_URL and is true either way.
- The deletion, rights and contact sections branch on supportContact(): with
  an email configured it is named as the private channel; without one the
  page says that deletion is the app's own Delete account control, that
  Buffer has no private support address at the moment, and that public
  issues must never carry personal details. No private way is promised.
- The sitemap already lists /privacy and /terms (tests/legal.test.ts covers
  it); nothing to change there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…cript imports

scripts/generate-dapp-store-assets.mjs imports sharp and rolldown, but neither
was declared: sharp was present only as an optional transitive dependency of
Next.js and rolldown only as a peer of vitest, so a fresh install with a
different resolution could leave the script without them.

Both are now exact devDependencies at the versions already in the lockfile
(sharp 0.35.5, rolldown 1.2.8). The lockfile changes only the two root
entries and the dev/optional flags of those packages and their platform
binaries; no version changed and node_modules was already up to date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…ase origin and HMAC destination fingerprints

src/server/rate-limit.ts posted RATE_LIMIT_SECRET to whatever
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL named. It now accepts only an https *.supabase.co
origin without credentials, query or fragment, the same pin
src/server/monitoring/repository.ts applies, and posts to that origin; any
other value leaves the shared limiter off and the local windows apply, so the
secret can never reach another host.

Discord and webhook destination fingerprints were unkeyed SHA-256 digests over
fields that include the destination token or secret. Owners see fingerprints
in their monitoring status, so one could be brute-forced offline against the
other, mostly known, fields. Both adapters now compute HMAC-SHA256 keyed with
BUFFER_ALERT_WORKER_SECRET (the fingerprintKey option in tests) over the same
fields, and refuse to describe destinations when that key is missing or
shorter than 32 characters. Rotating any field or the worker secret changes
the fingerprint, which pauses the bound rules until the destination is
re-verified; the docs describe that and the rotation steps.

Production has no registered destinations, so no stored fingerprint needs a
migration; the first registration will be an HMAC. Tests cover rejected
hosts never receiving the secret, origin normalisation, the exact HMAC, key
rotation and the missing-key refusal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
…t one hour

The signed-webhook adapter accepted only a bare seconds value in Retry-After
on a 429. An HTTP-date, which RFC 9110 allows and some receivers send, or any
value over an hour, was treated as a permanent failure (INVALID_RETRY_AFTER),
so a receiver asking for a longer pause lost the event for good.

parseRetryAfterMs reads delay seconds or an IMF-fixdate HTTP-date relative to
the adapter clock, caps both at one hour, and returns null for an absent or
unreadable header; retryAfter then schedules an ordinary retry (about thirty
seconds for null) with the existing floor and jitter, and never a permanent
failure. The outcome table in docs/WEBHOOK-ALERTS.md says so. Tests cover
both forms, a date already past, the cap on each form, unreadable headers
including obsolete date formats, and the parser's edge values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
A second Next.js advisory published after 16.3.8 is fixed in 16.4.3. The other
direct dependencies named by npm audit move to their patched releases where the
fix stays within the current major; what remains is either the React Native
chain that Mobile Wallet Adapter pulls in or has no patched release yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
@operatoruplift operatoruplift changed the title feat: dApp Store readiness: legal pages, account deletion, English-only shell, listing kit feat: dApp Store readiness, keyed rate limits, security-audit fixes and Next.js 16.4.3 Oct 24, 2026
operatoruplift and others added 2 commits October 25, 2026 20:27
Patches the @vitest/mocker advisory that Dependabot opened grouped PRs for; test
runner only, nothing shipped to users changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
Lighthouse's mobile legibility audit found most text on the app route below
12 px CSS (notes, hints, footnotes and labels at 8 to 11 px), which is small
on a 6-inch phone. Running text moves to 12 px and kickers, badges and compact
labels to 11 px; nothing is lowered. Measured on the built app at 390 px:
82.1% of text is now 12 px or larger, up from 21.5%.
The muted text colour moves from #65736e to #5a6863, which lifts the scenario
result labels from 4.41:1 to 5.2:1 against the panel background.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JHDgeGLvKoi7gnFqUbJ1sw
@operatoruplift
operatoruplift merged commit ee1d14d into main Oct 25, 2026
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